Nightmare on Blount Island

 The Höegh Xiamen Ship Fire Disaster. Dames Point Marine Terminal.

Words by Chip Drysdale[i] and Photos provided by Chip Drysdale

What follows is the story of the drama and intrigue surrounding a ship named the Höegh Xiamen that caught fire at Jacksonville’s Blount Island Marine Terminal on June 4, 2020. Some of JFRD’s (Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department) top officials were the cause of explosions that critically injured many firefighters. Their conspiracy to cover up their mistakes and carelessness was, at best, dishonorable and, at worst, could be considered criminal. The next ship fire at Blount Island could be catastrophically worse unless significant changes are made.

How could it be worse? This ship, Höegh Xiamen, transported cars. Imagine if we had a similar fire in a ship carrying bulk gasoline or, God forbid, military munitions. Unless JFRD is prepared, properly trained and equipped, Jacksonville could suffer a catastrophe greater than the 1947 Texas City Disaster or the 2020 Beirut Port explosion. Texas City’s fire involved a ship carrying fertilizer. The resulting explosion is still considered the deadliest industrial accident in U.S. History. It is also considered one of history’s largest non-nuclear explosions.

Some fire officials put their concerns about losing their appointed positions over the future safety of Jacksonville’s citizens and its firefighters. Many facts surrounding one of JFRD’s worst disasters, the Höegh Xiamen fire, have been concealed. The hard lessons learned about their catastrophic mistakes should be presented honestly and loudly to all.

My name is Charles (Chip) Drysdale. I have worked in the firefighting service for over forty years. Being a small part of the firefighting mission to save lives and property has been very meaningful and sustaining. Sadly, the JFRD mission has been compromised. Many of the facts about the Blount Island disaster that I am about to describe were kept secret from the public, state and federal investigative agencies, and the National Fire Service community.

I was strongly warned by several of JFRD’s executive-appointed chiefs and one union president not to reveal the truth. I understand that by revealing the hidden facts about this fire, my credibility will likely be attacked.

One government agency investigator warned me to fear retaliation from JFRD Director Keith Powers. Many fellow firefighters have told me the truth will not make any difference. But I have told them that we all have been risking our lives by charging into fires to save lives our entire careers; why should we not do as much as possible now to ensure the future safety of our citizens and firefighters? Based on the information I have just shared, and the facts I am about to present, please decide for yourself whether you believe there is a crisis of integrity that demands an upgrade. 

Currently I am a battalion chief. I supervise nine fire stations and am also responsible for the Marine Division.  For over forty years, as part of JFRD, I have been privileged to work with women and men who demonstrate exceptional courage, skill and integrity. I will retire later this year.  It is because of the affection and respect I have for my colleagues, my concern for the safety of my community, and all communities, that I write now.

The Fire

It was a warm summer day at the Dames Point Marine Terminal. Red and white tugboats pushed large ships onto and off the wharf. During an early afternoon rain shower, one of these ships, the Höegh Xiamen, had been moored alongside Berth 20. [ii]

 The Höegh Xiamen belonged to a class of car carrier ships called RoRos. This term describes how vehicles are “rolled onto and rolled off” the ramps inside the windowless steel ship hulls.  At 600 feet in length, Xiamen was essentially a giant floating parking garage. That afternoon, port stevedores had jammed her eleven decks with 2,420 cars.[iii] 

These cars were not new imports to be unloaded at U.S. ports. They were used cars destined for Western Africa.[iv] The stevedores described them as “junk cars.”[v] Many of the cars were in such disrepair that they had to be towed or carried by forklifts.[vi]

Xiamen’s crew had turned the fire alarm system off during the car-loading operations. This is standard practice for RoRos. Car exhaust fumes can cause false alarms in the tight deck spaces.[vii] The stevedores loaded the last car around 3:00 PM.[viii] The ship’s Chinese crew then prepared the Xiamen for departure. At this point, a crew member should have turned the fire alarm system back on.[ix] Unfortunately, this was not done.”[x]

Xiamen’s chartering company, Grimaldi Deep, has published procedures requiring the disconnecting of all car batteries.[xi] This reduces the risk of a car catching fire during transit. After the fire, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation found that many vehicles loaded onto Xiamen had their batteries connected. The NTSB’s investigation concluded that a spark or short in one of the components from a connected battery likely started a fire in a car engine compartment.[xii]

At approximately 3:45 p.m., Xiamen’s Chief Mate, Xiulei Zhang, saw smoke flowing from a vent on the top deck.[xiii] The ship’s crew was then alerted to a fire on deck 8. Despite their efforts, the fire increased in size. According to the NTSB, faulty or unsecured dampers allowed the fire to extend from deck 8 upward to decks 9, 10, and 11.[xiv] The review of the port camera footage later showed smoke flowing from the vents at the ship’s top deck throughout the incident.[xv]

Despite the fire’s discovery, Xiamen’s Captain, Shilian Zhang, did not call 911 or the Coast Guard on VHF Channel 16, the international marine distress radio frequency.[xvi] It was not until 15 minutes after the fire was discovered that a passerby who saw smoke coming from the vessel called 911.[xvii]  

According to the global consulting company Strategic Risk, “Car carrier vessels, in particular, can be more exposed to fire and stability issues than other vessels and require additional emphasis on risk management.” [xviii]  Xiamen’s fire risk plan included a carbon dioxide deck flooding system. Carbon dioxide displaces oxygen, which helps to smother the flames. Regrettably, the crew did not deploy carbon dioxide (CO2) until 30 minutes after discovering the fire. Because of this delay, the NTSB concluded that the CO2 was ineffective in suppressing the fire. [xix]

 Along with JFRD’s firefighters, I arrived soon after the 911 emergency system was activated. From the onset, it proved exceedingly difficult to communicate with Captain Zhang, who spoke very broken English.[xx] As the fire progressed, he gave us inaccurate and, at times, conflicting information about the ships’ fire protection systems, structural layout, and access to the decks. [xxi]

Due to Captain Zhang’s inaccurate information, several reconnaissance entries of the interior ship were required. Vital details were needed, such as whether the ship used CO2 or water mist as its fire suppression system, whether the stairwells had standpipe connections for fire fighting hoses, and what type of ramps were used to access the deck spaces.  

 Xiamen had its stern ramp lowered to the concrete wharf deck. This ramp allowed vehicles to be loaded into Deck 5. Along with several firefighter crews, we entered the port stern stairwell on Deck 5 and climbed up the stairwell to investigate the interior of the upper decks, 6 through 11. Based on what we had seen and after reviewing the ships’ fire plan, the other Chiefs on the scene and I developed an initial fire attack plan. Captain Zhang stated that the ship utilized an interior spiral ramp to move the vehicles from deck to deck. A third reconnaissance entry determined that Captain Zhang had made another false statement. [xxii]The ramps were “express” ramps. This required repositioning the engines and hose layouts. Every delay resulted in an increase in the “reflex time.” Reflex time is the time it takes after the arrival of the Fire Department and when a firefighter hose team applies the first water to the fire. Longer reflex times cause the fire to grow larger and more intense.

Offensive Attack

Based on thermal imagery and smoke conditions, several cars near the stern on Deck 8 were believed to be on fire. 

At 5:30 p.m., the first hose team entered Deck 8 from the port stern stairwell. Visibility from the smoke and the lack of paths between the cars made movement difficult. Ladder 4’s Lieutenant, Josh Montoro, told me they could see a glow in the stern area but could not reach it. [xxiii]

During the entry, the air quality in the stairwell was continuously monitored. As Forward Operations, I monitored the heat and smoke conditions above deck 8 while in the stairwell.

At approximately 5:40 p.m., Decks 8 and 9 had moderate grey smoke and heat, while Deck 10 had light smoke and no heat. The crews exited Deck 8 and were relieved by another group of firefighters. During the second hose team entry, I continued to check smoke and heat conditions at Decks 9 and 10.  

Fire rages out of control, and Evacuation

Soon after the second hose team entered Deck 8, I found that Deck 10 had dramatically changed from a normal warm air temperature to extremely hot. I was very concerned about this rapid change. I immediately rushed down the stairwell to order the firefighters to evacuate the ship. They did not need much encouragement to leave deck 8. Car tires had begun exploding from the rapidly rising temperatures. [xxiv] The exiting crew told me they thought they had found the fire. But it was not a fire. One of the Officers said to me, “Chief, we were chasing headlights.” This further showed me that the heat inside the ship had become too dangerous for interior operations. The wiring harnesses had begun to melt, causing electrical shorts that charged the headlights.

The attack hose line was left in place to hasten the evacuation from the ship. After checking to ensure everyone was off the ship, I ordered the Accountability Officers, Captain Tom Crow and Lt. Nate McNamee, to move away from the ship ramp and not let anyone back on the ship. I told them that we were going “defensive.” [xxv] A defensive firefighting strategy is used by firefighters when a fire is too large or dangerous to attack from the inside of a structure.

I then rushed over to the command center. [xxvi] Inside the air-conditioned “Command Van” were Director Keith Powers, Division Chief Steve Riska, Assistant Division Chief Mike Lesniak, Incident Commander, Chief Ryan Lundy, and others. I told them of the rapid buildup of extreme heat on decks 8, 9, and 10. I relayed that the hose line crews could not find the fire, let alone extinguish it. I told the Command Staff I had removed all firefighters from the ship. Due to possible structural collapse from the runaway fire, I recommended that the engines and other equipment be moved further away from the ship. I told the Command Staff that we needed to stay “defensive.” As the most experienced and knowledgeable marine firefighter in the room, I felt Director Powers and the other chiefs would have followed my recommendations.  

 Chief Lesniak then ordered me to “Rehab” and relieved me from my “Forward Operations” position. “Rehab” is an area in which firefighters are rehydrated and assessed for heat-related illnesses.  Chief Daryl Holsenbeck took over “Forward Operations.”  Before leaving the Command Center, I saw that the thermal camera image displayed on the large screen revealed a shocking picture. The entire four upper decks of the ship were glowing white hot. [xxvii] This meant decks 8 through 11 were full of burning vehicles, extreme heat, and combustible smoke. I was confident that this ship was done for and was relieved that no one had been hurt. I could not have imagined that the Command Staff would soon put firefighters back into that giant steel oven filled with over a thousand “junk” cars on fire.   

The fire inside Xiamen continued to burn. At one point, the smoke billowing out of the ship’s uppermost deck began slowing down. The firefighters sitting in the rehab area noticed this change. One firefighter asked me, “Chief, is the fire going out”?  I told him,” I think it’s starving for oxygen.”

One of the first lessons a fire service instructor teaches a firefighter student is the principle of the “fire triangle.” The fire triangle has three components or sides: fuel, heat, and oxygen. All three must be present for a fire to exist.

A dangerous situation can occur when only two sides of the fire triangle, heat and fuel, are present. The fire itself can consume all the available oxygen. Every firefighter has been trained to recognize the warning signs of this potentially deadly condition.

An explosion can occur if the missing oxygen is introduced into a superheated fuel-enriched space. Firefighters refer to this event as a backdraft. To prevent an explosive backdraft, firefighters must remove the excessive heat and smoke from the structure at its highest point, for example, by cutting a large hole in the roof of a burning building. The smoke itself can burn or explode. Smoke is a product of incomplete combustion. It is essentially unburnt fuel.

The burning cars had superheated Xiamen’s top four decks and had starved the explosive atmosphere of oxygen. Xiamen had become a floating bomb. It needed only fresh air to set it off.

I told the Command Staff about the rapid heat buildup. They could see the live thermal camera image of the ship’s now white-hot upper decks clearly displayed on the Command Center’s wall. Everyone could see the blistering and discoloration of the paint on Xiamen’s hull. An additional ominous sign was the diminishing smoke column. This was an obvious potential explosive backdraft condition.  

Shift from Defensive to Offensive Attack

The Command Staff made a fateful decision. They ignored my advice to remain defensive. They assembled fresh firefighter teams and ordered them to climb back inside Xiamen. Chief Lesniak and the Command Staff thought the firefighters could extinguish the raging inferno of hundreds of burning cars on multiple decks with a single handheld hose line. The Command Staff were ordering these firefighters to attempt the impossible. According to SSA Atlantic, one of the defendants in a suit filed after the ship fire in a Motion filed with the United States District Court, “The rapid heat build-up, discoloration of the exterior hull paint, and the distressing thermal image showing the superheated multiple decks did not in any way support the idea that the fire could be extinguished by using an offensive attack.” [xxviii]

 SSA Atlantic wrote, “Despite Chief Drysdale making the correct recommendations to move crews into a defensive posture, another Chief, Chief Lesniak, inexplicably moved them back into an attack posture.” [xxix]

Chief Mike Lesniak led the firefighters up the ramp to the ship. [xxx] This confused and concerned Captain Tom Crow. I had ordered Captain Crow not to let anyone back inside the ship. Captain Crow told Chief Lesniak, “Chief Drysdale said we are going defensive. What are we doing?”  Chief Lesniak responded,” We are going in. We are going to put this thing out.” [xxxi] As a former Navy sailor and firefighter aboard an aircraft carrier, Captain Crow understood the untenable and dangerous conditions the firefighters were being sent into. He pleaded unsuccessfully five times with Chief Lesniak not to send anyone back inside the ship. “Mike, we need to stop. This ship is telling you what it will do.” [xxxii] As have all firefighters, Captain Crow had been trained to “read smoke.” The color and force behind the smoke can warn us of dangerous conditions. Captain Crow saw that the Xiamen’s smoke was “turbulent and being pushed out the port side.” He described the fire based on what he saw in the smoke as “angry” and “pressure building up.” [xxxiii]

Chief Lesniak remained outside the ship after ordering the firefighters into Xiamen’s raging inferno.

The First Explosion

SSA Atlantic wrote, “JFRD restarted the attack, continuing to send in waves of firefighters. Then, JFRD made another critical mistake. Even though its commanders knew that firefighters were inside the Vessel, those commanders ordered JFRD personnel to introduce oxygen into the superheated interior of the Vessel”. [xxxiv]

How did the Command Staff add oxygen, the missing side of the fire triangle, into Xiamen’s superheated explosive internal atmosphere?

RoRos are unique ships that require additional safety considerations. Their ventilation systems are designed to achieve up to 20 air changes per hour. This large airflow is required to remove vehicle exhaust during loading and unloading. [xxxv] 

 Xiamen’s topside weather deck had over 60 large ventilation housing boxes. These structures covered large shafts that reached down into the enclosed deck spaces. Some of these shafts supplied fresh air to the lower decks. And some removed the contaminated air from the loading operations. [xxxvi]

According to the International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA), “A thorough understanding of a vessel’s ventilation system is necessary to use it effectively during a fire. Improper ventilation may cause a flashover or backdraft to occur.” [xxxvii]

With the firefighter teams inside Xiamen on deck 8, Chief Holsenbeck placed electric fans at the doors to decks 7 and 8. This placement provided a pressurized source of fresh oxygen underneath and at the base of the superheated and smoke (fuel) enriched decks. The fresh air only served to increase the fire intensity. Imagine putting a lawn blower into the lower vent of a charcoal grill or fire pit. The effects are dramatic. At 6:37 (and 36 seconds) PM, Chief Holsenbeck ordered Ladder 7’s crew to open the port and starboard vents to decks 7, 8, and 9 without knowing which were supply or exhaust vents.[xxxviii] He radioed to them, “Anything that you can open that would access those three decks would be great.”[xxxix] This final reckless decision would soon light the fuse that would seal the fate of the firefighters inside Xiamen.

SSA Atlantic wrote, “JFRD utterly neglected training and proceeded with its attack and venting despite indisputable signs it should not.” [xl]

Ladder 7’s Lt. Richard Harman wrote, “Chief Holsenbeck told ladder 7 to make sure the vents on the port and starboard sides were open and flowing. We then received an order to open all vent doors.” [xli]

Ladder 7’s Engineer, John McMullen, wrote, “So we began opening vents on both the dockside and river side of the ship. These vents were large square boxes with large access doors leading into each one of them.” “About 60 seconds after forcing the vent on the river side of the ship, you began to hear a loud roar that sounded like a jet engine. The ship began to shake, and we all took off. I yelled at the guys, “Run, run, run!” as the loudest, most violent purge of heat/exhaust blew from that vent stack.” [xlii]

At or around 6:43 (3 seconds) p.m., Ladder 7 Lieutenant Harmon radioed Chief Holsenbeck, “We just had a pretty forceful ventilation out of one of those stacks. “We had it open for about thirty seconds, and that thing blew. “  [xliii]

Lt. Harmon told me in a phone conversation on November 16, 2024, that when the first explosion occurred, “we ran like their lives depended on it.” He said the steel deck they were standing on was so hot that their fire boots were melting.

JFRD Director Powers gave a press conference interview immediately after the first explosion. He stated, “You can see the side of the ship that is burnt.”. Director Powers ironically then said,” The goal of the commanders, and I have been in there (Command Van) the whole time, is to ensure we do it safely. “There was a minor explosion while they (firefighters) were inside. I am not sure what that was. We have no injuries yet. Our goal is to make sure they get home safely to their families. “ [xliv]

Captain Crow was on Xiamen’s loading ramp during the explosion. He stated, “I heard what sounded like a jet engine warming up, and I could feel the ground begin to shake. Smoke was pushed out port side and aloft.” [xlv] After the explosion, Captain Crow advised Chief Lesniak, “We need to get them out now. It just warned you.” [xlvi]

Unfortunately, Chief Lesniak and the Command Staff did not heed Xiamen’s warning signs about what it was threatening to do. Chief Lesniak did not evacuate the firefighters from the interior of Xiamen.

It was obvious to many that the opening of the vents had caused the first explosion. Engineer McMullen wrote,” I remember telling Lt. Harmon that I felt like we caused the explosion. We vented the hatch/vent/stack and allowed cool air to get down into the superheated space when it did. BAM. “ [xlvii]

The definition of insanity.

At 6:43 p.m. (48 seconds), PM Chief Holsenbeck ordered Ladder 7 to continue additional ventilation operations despite the dramatic explosion and ominous warning signs. [xlviii] [xlix] SSA Atlantic wrote, “They purposefully introduced oxygen-rich air into a superheated environment by venting from the roof not once, but twice.” [l]

Engineer McMullen described what happened next. “We again opened the same vent hatch that had moments before blown open. Again, about 60 seconds later, the sound came back. This time, it was louder. It was the loudest thing that I have ever heard. The whole ship began shaking. We all took off again. I saw the vent stack disintegrate.” “June 4th was the only time in my entire life or my professional career that I thought my crew and I were done for.” “I thought my face was melting off, and I could not breathe. [li]

Down below on the pier. At about 6:46 p.m., while sitting in rehab, the other firefighters and I could feel the concrete pier shaking.[lii]  I could feel the pier shaking like a locomotive was coming down the pier. You could hear and feel a rumbling start from the bow of the ship, and then it ran the length of the ship to the stern.” I saw a white steam-like cloud blow out of the top stern area, with debris blown out in multiple directions. It was not until I heard the clanging sounds of the debris hitting the concrete that I realized the debris was steel plating that had been blown off Xiamen’s hull. [liii]

The chiefs inside the Command Van did not know at the time that the firefighters inside Xiamen were fighting for their lives.

Chief Jolly, who was leading a firefighter team inside Xiamen during the second explosion, wrote, “I was blown down the stairwell head first. I thought to myself, if this heat does not stop soon, I am going to die here.” “Heat I have never felt before that I can only imagine what would be similar to standing behind a jet engine.” [liv]

Firefighter Nicholas Gettler, who was at the entry to the stairwell, wrote,” It felt like hurricane-force winds of extremely hot air were blowing by us.” [lv]

Lt. Paul Masci, who had just been relieved and was walking down the stairwell, wrote, “I remember thinking I’m going to die on this ship.” [lvi] He was blown down past the entry deck.

Lt. Jeremy Lee wrote that he was in the stairwell near the Deck 5 entry. “I noticed the heat and pressure were so great that they continued pinning me against the door/ground until the blast wave passed.” [lvii]

Engineer Wes Miller, who was also at the Deck 5 stairwell entry, wrote,” Pushed into a wall, loss of consciousness, I came to and felt intense heat, a dog pile of firefighters blocked the exit door, I crouched down in a corner until the heat dissipated. [lviii]

After the explosion, there was an eerie quiet. The steam and smoke slowly drifted away from the ship. I thought, “Thank God no one was inside that ship.” Then I heard a portable radio crackle to life in the silence: “Firefighter down. We have a Firefighter down.”  

The Injured Firefighters

While I pulled up my protective fire pants, I saw Chief Holsenbeck and a group of firefighters running up the ship ramp toward the interior of Xiamen. I thought, “That doesn’t make sense. They should not be going in. They needed to move back.” [lix]

Lt. Nate McNamee, our Accountability Officer, ran to me and said, “Chief, we need eight rescues.”  I then mentally switched from wondering what had happened to responding to the immediate problem. I announced on the radio, “Fire Com, send me five more rescues. Fire 4 is establishing a Medical Branch.” [lx]

I moved towards the ship and appointed two rescue chiefs to supervise Treatment and Transport. I assumed responsibility for the initial Triage.  

Captain Tom Crow approached the first Firefighter walking out of Xiamen. FF Tim O’Brien had his hands extended. He told Captain Crow, “Oh my God, Tommy! So, fucking hot. Anyone above me is hurt or dead. Tommy! I am burning. They are dead if they were above me.” [lxi]

Captain Crow then saw Chief Joe Deloach walking towards him. He wrote, “He had both hands extended and a blank stare on his face. The skin on his hands and ears was sloughing off. His hair melted, and his face had what looked like first-degree burns. He was not responding to me when I called him Chief. But when I grabbed him and said, Joe! He looked at me and said,” I am hurt bad, Tom! Tell my wife and kids that I love them and take care of them.” [lxii]

I continued triaging the injured firefighters after they were wheeled away from the ship on stretchers. The men had third-degree burns, open fractures, faces covered in blood, and deformed hands. “Trauma alerts” were called, hospital capabilities checked, and rescues were rapidly loaded and sent to the Trauma Center. I was extremely concerned that the two chiefs were going to die before they reached the hospital. Five of the injured were so severely burned that they were sent to the Shands Burn Center in Gainesville, Florida.

As the light of the day faded, you could hear the last rescue siren growing faint in the distance. Everyone seemed like they were in a daze. But the ship was still burning.

Questions Begin

I had warned the Command Staff earlier about a possible structural collapse. The situation was now even more dire. I thought we still needed to move our vehicles and equipment further away. I rushed to the Command Van and was met by Chief Lesniak walking down the stairs. Chief Lesniak looked shell-shocked and said, “What have I done, what have I done, what have I done”? This was very confusing to me. I was still confused about why the firefighters were inside the ship after I had evacuated them. It would be several years later before I would know that the Command Staff had not only shoved them back into the inferno; they purposely vented Xiamen, which caused the explosion that injured the firefighters. The March 21, 2024, NTSB Report on the Höegh Xiamen Fire states, “It is likely, not coincidental, that the “explosion” occurred about the same time that the firefighters opened the exhaust (vent). “The deck likely contained a rich atmosphere of heated flammable vapors, which rapidly combusted when fresh air was introduced via the opening of the ventilation trunks for decks 9 and 10/11. [lxiii]

JFRD was not trained or prepared.

How and why did this tragic disaster occur? Jacksonville is one of the largest vehicle-handling Ports in the United States. How could a large metropolitan Fire Department with a 400-million-dollar yearly budget have performed so poorly at the Xiamen ship fire?

According to the IFSTA’s Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based Firefighters: “Each local jurisdiction has the responsibility to assess its hazards and develop a response plan for those hazards.” (2) It is crucial to provide its personnel with the training to operate within the plan.” [lxiv]

SSA Atlantic wrote, “As JFRD’s own firefighters (and leadership) discussed after the incident, they were poorly served by an inexcusable lack of training within the department. Before this incident, JFRD had not meaningfully trained its firefighters or its commanders in maritime firefighting in over a decade.” In its own 30(b)(6) deposition, JFRD admitted that the firefighters’ training was inadequate for a maritime blaze.” [lxv] “JFRD completely fails to train its firefighters for maritime emergencies, despite Jacksonville’s status as a major port.”  [lxvi]

SSA Atlantic also wrote, “JFRD had also never trained its firefighters on ship ventilation systems or RoRo carbon dioxide suppression systems. This lack of firefighting training is doubly perplexing since, as one deponent testified, ‘Jacksonville is a seagoing city.’” [lxvii]

Lt. Jeremy Lee summed up the sentiments of many of JFRD’s firefighters with a comment to Chief Lesniak at a May 3, 2021, meeting. He stated,” Y’all will spend a lot of time and money on making a thirty-minute video on how to lift a stretcher so as not to hurt your back. But you won’t spend a f…ing dime on making a five-minute video on how not to die in a ship fire.” [lxviii]

The Cover Up

Less than a week after the fire, several members of the JFRD Executive Staff and the Local IAFF Union President, Randy Wyse, would begin a conscious and deliberate effort to conceal the mistakes that were made that resulted in one of the worst disasters in JFRD’s 140-year history,

Four days after the explosion that injured the firefighters, Captain Tom Crow’s wife, Sharon Crow, authored a heartfelt email to Director Powers. One of the many concerns she addressed was in response to a local news interview comment by President Wyse. She wrote,” I watched on the news when President Wyse stated that ‘ALL JFRD personnel receive extensive training in shipboard firefighting.’ Hmm, in the 30-plus years I have lived in Jacksonville, I do not recall a shipboard fire being this big, nor do I ever remember so many firefighters being injured in one single incident, along with not ever recalling my husband being involved in “extensive” shipboard firefighting training, I feel that the “extensive” comment is incorrect. [lxix]

Two days after Ms. Crow’s email expressing concerns about President Wyse’s comment, JFRD Director Powers appointed President Wyse to a committee tasked to investigate the JFRD’s performance in the Xiamen fire.

Director Powers created the Blount Island Shipboard Fire Committee to “investigate this incident and complete an after-action report.” The committee would be composed of only three people. President Wyse, Chief Darin Hooten (Battalion Chief), and Chief Eric Courtis (President of the JFRD Fraternal Order of Fire Chiefs). [lxx]

Several days after the fire, Charles Chapman, Investigator for the Florida State Fire Marshal, requested relevant SOGs, reports, statements from key personnel, and radio transcripts from the JFRD Committee. The next day, in an email to Investigator Chapman, Chief Hooten stated, “The committee priority would be to gather statements from 30-40 personnel.” [lxxi]

The JFRD Committee initially withheld at least two completed statements from key personnel from the State Fire Marshal’s office, including Captain Crow and myself. Both of our withheld statements described our concerns about the shift from a defensive attack to an offensive one. Our statements also suggested that the JFRD needed more shipboard firefighting training.

When the State Fire Marshal’s Investigator, Susan Schell, learned of the omitted official statements, she requested copies from Captain Crow and me. When we both searched our work email for our “Statement” sent to the JFRD Committee, we discovered the typed responses to our Statement questions had been mysteriously erased. Fortunately, we kept hard copies of our statements and sent them to Investigator Schell.

It should be noted that the JFRD Investigative Committee did not give the recording of the two-way radio communications from the fire to the SFM. Instead, Chief Darin Hooten sent a written transcript created by his wife, JFRD Chief Tracey Hooten. [lxxii]  This is in stark contrast to most public safety agencies. Most choose to use professional transcription services to produce accurate and complete documentation that can be relied on as evidence in formal investigations and legal proceedings.

On August 27, 2020, the Florida State Fire Marshall received the JFRDs Investigation and After-Action Report. Section 4 of the report stated, “The committee ascertains that from all outward and inward appearances, the fire on this ship appeared manageable and did present itself as a fire that could be extinguished by an interior attack.”  The Report stated, “The Incident Commander, chiefs inside the ship, and chiefs leading the fire attack teams had good reason to believe that the fire could be extinguished by using an offensive attack.” [lxxiii]

The Committee’s statement that an offensive attack could extinguish the fire based on “all outward and inward appearances” appears to conflict with the multiple reports from the chiefs on the scene and what the Command staff could see from inside the Command Van. [lxxiv]

As early as 5:00 PM, Chief Deloach had radioed to Command that there was “heavy smoke on floors seven through eleven and heavy heat on floors eight through eleven.” Afterward, he radioed that “char marks” were on the ship’s side. At 5:42 PM, Chief Deloach told Command, “There’s been an explosion on the eighth floor, and everyone is out.” [lxxv]

After I evacuated all personnel from the ship and put all operations into a “Defensive” mode, I told the chiefs in the Command Van about the rapid heat build-up on decks 8, 9, and 10. I said, “We must stay defensive and consider moving all the apparatus further back from the ship.” [lxxvi]

The Command Van’s large screen displayed the thermal camera image of the four white-hot upper decks, clearly visible to the command staff.

The “inward and outward appearances” were also obvious to Captain Crow, who wrote,” On the starboard side of the vessel, the paint on the ship’s hull was blistered and continuing to blister to larger areas to the point that portions of the paint were falling off the vessel’s hull. These “outward appearances” distressed Captain Crow. He had unsuccessfully pleaded five times with Chief Lesniak not to send anyone back inside the ship: “Mike, we need to stop. This ship is telling you what it will do.” [lxxvii]

Even Director Powers knew of the serious outward and inward appearances before the fateful offensive attack. In a First Coast News press conference (before the second explosion that injured the firefighters), Director Powers said, “Firefighters on board are dealing with zero visibility and enough heat to make the paint peel off the outside of the vessel.” “There was a minor explosion while they (firefighters) were inside. I am not sure what that was.” [lxxviii]

Based on these “appearances,” it should have been clear that an interior attack using a single handheld hose line would not have even come close to extinguishing the hundreds of burning cars jammed into four floors totaling over five acres of deck space!

SSA Atlantic wrote, “JFRD utterly neglected training and proceeded with its attack and venting despite indisputable signs it should not.”  [lxxix]

On July 15, 2020, I met with Division Chief Steve Riska and Assistant Division Chief Mike Lesniak. I felt that the JFRD Administration would now be willing to train its firefighters in ship fire operations because of the Xiamen fire disaster. I built a PowerPoint presentation that proposed creating a JFRD shipboard firefighting training program. The presentation outlined the challenges of ship firefighting and a plan to meet those challenges. At the presentation’s conclusion, Chiefs Lesniak and Riska told me there would be no ship firefighting training program. And then, both Chiefs told me to “stop pointing fingers at the Fire Department.”

Within ten minutes of leaving the meeting with Chief Riska and Chief Lesniak, I received a call on my personal phone from our International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Local Union President, Randy Wyse. He ordered me to report to his Union office at 9:00 a.m..  

The next morning, President Wyse told me in a closed-door meeting to “stop pointing fingers at the Fire Department.” I asked him what he meant by this. Wyse said,” You are telling people that you pulled the firefighters out of the ship and went Defensive.”  I stated that I had pulled the firefighters out of the ship and then went to the Command Van and told the Command Staff what I had done. I told him that I then recommended they remain “Defensive.” Wyse asked me, “Who heard you say this?” I told him, “Chiefs Lesniak, Riska, Lundy, Director Powers, and others.” Wyse then became quiet and stern. He said clearly and slowly, “No one heard you say that.”

SSA Atlantic stated, “Chief Drysdale correctly moved them to a defensive posture. Drysdale precisely communicated this in the Command Van. Chief Drysdale’s testimony is unequivocal.”  [lxxx]

I then told Wyse that I had met with Chief Lundy to understand how the firefighters had been injured. We discussed how I had removed the firefighters from the ship due to rapidly rising heat conditions on multiple decks. Wyse said, “I talked with Chief Lundy, and he does not remember your conversation with him.” At this point, I could feel the hair on the back of my neck standing up. Wyse and the JFRD Executive Staff were not interested in the safety of our firefighters. I could only assume they were “circling the wagons” to defend their jobs.

The JFRD Administration did not feel it was enough for one Division Chief, an Assistant Division Chief, and one of the three JFRD Ship Fire Investigation Committee members to tell me not to talk about the defensive shift. They instructed the second of the three appointed members of the Committee, Battalion Chief Darin Hooten, to “counsel” me in two meetings with him. Chief Hooten told me to stop talking about the defensive shift. Chief Hooten used phrases such as ‘You need to let it go” and “It’s water under the bridge.”

It should be noted that nowhere in the JFRDs Committee’s Investigative Report submitted to the Florida State Fire Marshal (SFM), NTSB, or the Coast Guard, was there any mention of the defensive shift and evacuation of the firefighters to safety before the explosion that injured the firefighters. The Report did not mention the clear signs of an out-of-control ship fire before the firefighters were sent back inside the ship. The Report instead makes multiple dubious references to how the “fire could be extinguished by an interior attack” and that there were no audible or transcribed specific, imminent dangers to the firefighters prior to the “event” (explosion). [lxxxi] There was no mention of the first explosion, an obvious and fateful warning sign. Nothing in the Report mentioned the tragic decision to vent the ship twice while the firefighters were inside the ship.

The JFRD Investigative Committee also withheld from their Report a statement they had requested from Captain Brandice Johnson. She was the primary 911 telecommunicator during the first day of the Xiamen fire. Her statement included her concerns about the incident deviating from the normal safety structures and organization procedures. She also identified a breakdown and lack of communication during the fire.

During the fire, Captain Johnson followed 911 Telecommunication’s best practices for documentation. She transcribed important actions and messages transmitted on the radio system into the computer-aided dispatch system (CAD). According to Bob Smith, an internationally known public safety communications expert and a director with APGO International, “Telecommunicators should strive to record as much information as possible at each and every stage of an incident, and agencies should have mechanisms in place to ensure this practice is followed and vital records are preserved.”[lxxxii] A 911 communication officer’s notes are legal records and subject to subpoena.

Captain Johnson performed very well in recording incident information despite rapid radio transmissions. She was surprised when her supervisor ordered her not to record future emergency incident information. In an email to Captain Johnson, her supervisor wrote, “In the best interest of JFRD, please refrain from transcribing the progression of the incident in the CAD notes.”[lxxxiii] Why would the JFRD leadership suppress the taking of notes?

Further evidence of the “cover-up” includes a major omission of critical actions in an official JFRD Emergency Pro Reporting system report. Emergency Pro is a software program for creating a local and national legal record of emergency events. Chiefs Lundy and Holsenbeck crafted the Xiamen fire “Primary” report at JFRD’s Headquarters on June 16, 2020. They detailed the tactics and conditions from the start of the incident at 3:59 p.m. until 5:49 p.m. After 5:49 p.m., tactics and conditions are mysteriously missing for 57 minutes. The report conveniently resumes giving details and conditions at 6:46 p.m., which is when the second explosion happened, injuring the firefighters. In those missing 57 minutes, the report omitted documenting the rapid rise in heat on decks 8, 9, and 10 and the evacuation of the firefighters. It left out my briefing to the Command Staff in which I described the superheated conditions and my recommendation to stay defensive. This official report failed to divulge the Command Staff’s decision to shift back to an offensive attack. The report omitted Chief Holsenbeck’s ordering of the multiple venting operations on decks 7,8, and 9 with firefighters inside. They did not disclose the obvious warning sign after the initial venting operation caused the first explosion. [lxxxiv]  

Lessons not Learned

As with any organization, learning from others’ experiences is an important process in the fire service. Most major metropolitan fire departments work hard to improve their public service delivery. This results in more lives being saved and property being preserved. Some of these processes are “Lessons Learned, Investigations, and After-Action Reviews.” Public safety organizations use these processes to train and educate their personnel and share the lessons learned with other agencies.

The JFRD Executive Staff never made its Höegh Fire After-Action Report available internally or to any other Fire Departments. Even JFRD’s own firefighters have never been informed about the tactics and mistakes made during the Höegh ship fire. It’s as if the Xiamen fire never happened.

 In an email to Director Powers, Sharon Crow wrote, “Why would there not be a giant debriefing, teaching, learning, and discussion moment that included every person there that day?  A hash it out, learn from our mistake’s moment for all. [lxxxv]  

On July 5, 2023, at Port Newark, New Jersey, the Newark Fire Division faced a fire like JFRD’s Xiamen fire. It was a fire in a RoRo ship with 1,200 used cars also destined for West Africa. Newark fire Captains Augusto “Augie” Acabou and Wayne “Bear” Brooks Jr. tragically died while fighting the blaze. 

A preliminary investigation by the Coast Guard and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health indicated that the Newark Fire Department “had little to no maritime firefighting training, experience or familiarization with cargo ships of any type.” [lxxxvi]  

Imagine if Captains Acabou and Brooks were allowed to read about JFRD’s experience with Xiamen. They and their Fire Department may have averted the tragedy if they had learned from JFRD’s tactical mistakes and lessons.

The International Association of Firefighters General President Edward Kelly responded strongly to the Newark ship fire tragedy. “The Newark Fire Department needs new leadership, period,” said Kelly, who joined relatives of the dead firefighters outside on a frigid afternoon during a break in Wednesday’s hearing. “The level of incompetence and negligence rises to, in my opinion, [being] criminal.”

IAFF National President Kelly’s standing up for the firefighters’ safety starkly contrasts IAFF’s Local 122 President Randy Wyse’s working with the JFRD Executive Staff to cover up their incompetence and negligence demonstrated in JFRD’s Xiamen fire. [lxxxvii]

Has the Jacksonville Fire Rescue Department learned its lessons from the Xiamen fire? JFRD’s Xiamen Investigation Committee recommended that all its firefighters be trained to a Shipboard Firefighter 1 and 2 level. In the five years since the Xiamen ship fire, only 16 % of the over 1800 uniformed firefighters have taken the entry level Land Based Marine Firefighter class. [lxxxviii] The Committee also recommended that a “command, control, and resource management class” be developed for the chiefs and officers. This has not been done.

This Report aims to save lives by honestly and transparently publishing mistakes and lessons learned in the Xiamen ship fire. It is hoped that other Fire Departments will prepare for and safely respond to these ever-increasing dangerous fires aboard these massive floating parking garages called RoRos.

Note: Two of the injured firefighters’ names were changed to reduce further injury to what they have already experienced and will continue to suffer from the fire.

[i] Charles “Chip” Drysdale is a Battalion Chief with the Jacksonville Fire Rescue Department. He currently supervises nine fire stations and the Marine Division. He is a former JFRD Division Chief of Operations and Division Chief of Training.

[ii]  National Transportation Safety Board, Fire aboard Roll-on/Roll-off Vehicle Carrier Hoegh Xiamen, Mar 21/04, 27

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR2104.pdf

[iii] Ibid, vii

[iv] Ibid, 11

[v] Ibid, 20

[vi] Ibid, 16

[vii] Ibid, 46

[viii] Ibid, 2

[ix] Ibid, viii

[x] Ibid, 21,46

[xi] Ibid, viii,17,21

[xii] Ibid, 40

[xiii] Ibid, 3

[xiv] Ibid, 48,49

[xv] Ibid, 28

[xvi] Ibid, 47

[xvii] Ibid, 5

[xviii] Vessel Fires Remain Key Safety and Supply Risk, 2/21/2022, https://www.strategic-risk-global.com/catastrophe-risk/vessel-fires-remain-key-safety-and-supply-chain-risk/1440403.article

[xix] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 49

[xx] Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department, Blount Island Shipboard Fire Committee, Investigation and After Action Report, 10/11/20, 36

[xxi] Drysdale Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 72:73, 96, 99, 105, 109

[xxii] Ibid, 105,109

[xxiii] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 4

[xxiv] Drysdale Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 128:136

[xxv] Crow Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 33:34, 98:99

[xxvi] Ibid, 34

[xxvii] Drysdale Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 139:140

[xxviii] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 8

[xxix] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 8/1/23, 8

[xxx] Crow Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 36,39

[xxxi] Ibid, 36

[xxxii] Ibid, 37

[xxxiii] Crow Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 41

[xxxiv] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 8/1/23, 2

[xxxv] SOLAS Convention, Regulations 11-2/19.34, 1974

[xxxvi] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 12:14

[xxxvii] International Fire Service Training Association, Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based Firefighters, 2010, 368

[xxxviii] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[xxxix] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[xl] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 16

[xli] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 43

[xlii] Ibid,  54:55

[xliii] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 33

[xliv] 9 Firefighters injured from a vehicle carrying ship fire in Blount Island, First Coast News, ABC, 6/4/2020, https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/firefighters-respond-to-auto-hauler-ship-fire-on-blount-island/77-3933d703-804f-404d-8510-b2e5c9d43ff5

[xlv] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 45

[xlvi][xlvi] Ibid, 43

[xlvii] Ibid, 55

[xlviii] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[xlix] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 34

[l] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 21

[li] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 55

[lii] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[liii] Ibid, 42

[liv] Ibid, 38

[lv] Ibid, 33

[lvi] Ibid, 29

[lvii] Ibid, 31

[lviii] Ibid, 28

[lix] Ibid, 42

[lx] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 34, 36

[lxi] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 51

[lxii] Ibid, 51

[lxiii] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 49:50

[lxiv] IFSTA, Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based Firefighters, 2010,

[lxv] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 1:2

[lxvi] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 3

[lxvii] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 4

[lxviii] JFRD Training Bulletin, 12/16/20

[lxix] Sharon Crow, “email message to”, Chief Powers, 6/8/2020

[lxx] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 4

[lxxi] Florida Bureau of Fire Standards and Training Safety Section, Fatality/Injury Investigation Report, JFRD Hoegh Xiamen Shipboard Fire, 6/04/20, 9

[lxxii] Florida Bureau of Fire Standards, Hoegh Fire Report, 23

[lxxiii] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 9

[lxxiv] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 29

[lxxv] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 16,19,24

[lxxvi] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 2, 7:9, 16

[lxxvii] Ibid, 8

[lxxviii] Powers Press Conference, First Coast News, 6/04/20

[lxxix] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 16

[lxxx] Ibid, 17

[lxxxi] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 7:9

[lxxxii] Bob Smith, Public Safety Communications Magazine, 7/08

[lxxxiii] Catherine Cyrus, email message to Brandice Johnson, 10/12/21

[lxxxiv] Richard Lundy, JFRD Emergency Pro Romeo Report, FR-00064084-2020—06-04

[lxxxv] Sharon Crow, “email message to”, Chief Powers, 6/8/2020

[lxxxvi] Wayne Perry, Associated Press, Investigative hearings open into cargo ship fire that killed 2 New Jersey firefighters, 1/10/24, https://whyy.org/articles/nj-cargo-ship-fire-firefighter-deaths-investigative-hearings-open/

[lxxxvii]  FireRescue1, Associated Press, Wayne Parry January 17, 2024, https://whyy.org/articles/newark-cargo-ship-blaze-firefighter-deaths-call-to-fire-department-leadership/

88 Interview with Capt. Ashton Geohagen, JFRD Fire Division, 3/18/25

Appendix A: Current State of Affairs

Appendix B: Timeline summary

Times quoted or estimated from:

Incident Details Report FR-000640084-2020-06-04

2020 Shipboard Fire-Investigation and After Action Report

Radio transcript created by Chief Hooten (no transmission times given).

June 4, 2020, all p.m.

4:01 First JFRD Units dispatched.

4:04 First Unit, E-48 arrives

4:24 Forward Operations F-4 reports language barriers, Co2 alarms, report of decks 7/ 8 full of smoke

4:24 F-4 Reports all crew accounted for

4:35 F-4, L-30 and E-35 make recon entry into ship

5:00 F-9 reports heavy heat decks 8-11

5:33 C-2A arrives on scene

5:35 L-4 making entry into deck 8

5:43 F-9 reports explosion on 8th floor (tires?)

5:46 F-4 reports all JFRD crews on entry deck leaving the ship

5:49 F-4 reports Deck 7 smoke but no heat, Decks 8/9 full of heat and smoke

???   F-4 evacuates all firefighters from the ship after a rapid, intense heat rise on deck 10.

    Shifts operations from offensive to defensive. Recommended to Command and Executive Staff

     remain defensive and move vehicles and equipment further away from the ship. F-4 sent to Rehab

     by C-2A.

6:04 F-1 has assumed Forward Operations and shifts operations from defensive back to offensive.

6:04 A Loud siren noise was reported by R-49

6:04 F-1 directs C2A to the top of ship to shut the starboard side hatches

6:25 L-7 reports all roof hatches secure

6:26 F-1 reports fans running on decks 8/9

6:35 L-7 reports smoke coming out of deck 9 vent

6:37 F-1 tells L-7, “Anything you can open that will access those three decks would be great”

6:41 L-7 reports “access doors to top vents opened for decks 7-9 on starboard side”

6:43 L-7 reports “a hatch blew”.

6:43 F-1 responds, “L-7, can you get it gated”? (kept open)

6:46 L-34 reports an explosion

6:48 F-4 tells FCOM “need 5 Rescues”

6:51 F-4 establishes Medical Branch

6/10/ 20: Director Powers creates Blount Island Shipboard Fire Committee

7/15/20:  I meet with Chiefs Lesniak/Riska. Told that there would be no training and ordered to “not  

               point fingers.”

7/16/20:  I’m ordered to the Union office. Told by Wyse to “not point fingers.”

8/27/20:  SFM receives JFRD After Action Report2/3/21:  NTSB publishes its report

5/12/21: SFM Investigators interview me.

5/27/21: Discover my AAR Committee questionnaire stripped of my answers

unknown: SFM meets with JFRD Director Powers and asks for missing documents

1/20/22: Told not to talk about the ship fire by Chief Hooten in his office

8/23/22:  SFM Investigator Schell meets with Director Powers, and he wants to know how she knew about the shift to defensive and then back to offensive. She called me and warned me of possible retaliation by Director Powers

7/5/23: Newark Fire Captains killed in RoRo ship fire in Port Newark

________________________________

 [1] Charles “Chip” Drysdale is a Battalion Chief with the Jacksonville Fire Rescue Department. He currently supervises nine fire stations and the Marine Division. He is a former JFRD Division Chief of Operations and Division Chief of Training.

[1]  National Transportation Safety Board, Fire aboard Roll-on/Roll-off Vehicle Carrier Hoegh Xiamen, Mar 21/04, 27

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/MAR2104.pdf

[1] Ibid, vii

[1] Ibid, 11

[1] Ibid, 20

[1] Ibid, 16

[1] Ibid, 46

[1] Ibid, 2

[1] Ibid, viii

[1] Ibid, 21,46

[1] Ibid, viii,17,21

[1] Ibid, 40

[1] Ibid, 3

[1] Ibid, 48,49

[1] Ibid, 28

[1] Ibid, 47

[1] Ibid, 5

[1] Vessel Fires Remain Key Safety and Supply Risk, 2/21/2022, https://www.strategic-risk-global.com/catastrophe-risk/vessel-fires-remain-key-safety-and-supply-chain-risk/1440403.article

[1] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 49

[1] Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department, Blount Island Shipboard Fire Committee, Investigation and After Action Report, 10/11/20, 36

[1] Drysdale Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 72:73, 96, 99, 105, 109

[1] Ibid, 105,109

[1] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 4

[1] Drysdale Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 128:136

[1] Crow Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 33:34, 98:99

[1] Ibid, 34

[1] Drysdale Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 139:140

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 8

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 8/1/23, 8

[1] Crow Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 36,39

[1] Ibid, 36

[1] Ibid, 37

[1] Crow Dep. Jolly v. Hoegh, 41

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 8/1/23, 2

[1] SOLAS Convention, Regulations 11-2/19.34, 1974

[1] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 12:14

[1] International Fire Service Training Association, Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based Firefighters, 2010, 368

[1] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[1] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 16

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 43

[1] Ibid,  54:55

[1] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 33

[1] 9 Firefighters injured from a vehicle carrying ship fire in Blount Island, First Coast News, ABC, 6/4/2020, https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/firefighters-respond-to-auto-hauler-ship-fire-on-blount-island/77-3933d703-804f-404d-8510-b2e5c9d43ff5

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 45

[1][1] Ibid, 43

[1] Ibid, 55

[1] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[1] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 34

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 21

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 55

[1] JFRD, Incident Details Report, FR-00064084-2020-06-04, 6/19/2020, 6

[1] Ibid, 42

[1] Ibid, 38

[1] Ibid, 33

[1] Ibid, 29

[1] Ibid, 31

[1] Ibid, 28

[1] Ibid, 42

[1] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 34, 36

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 51

[1] Ibid, 51

[1] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 49:50

[1] IFSTA, Marine Fire Fighting for Land-Based Firefighters, 2010,

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 1:2

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 3

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 4

[1] JFRD Training Bulletin, 12/16/20

[1] Sharon Crow, “email message to”, Chief Powers, 6/8/2020

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 4

[1] Florida Bureau of Fire Standards and Training Safety Section, Fatality/Injury Investigation Report, JFRD Hoegh Xiamen Shipboard Fire, 6/04/20, 9

[1] Florida Bureau of Fire Standards, Hoegh Fire Report, 23

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 9

[1] NTSB, Fire Aboard Xiamen, 29

[1] Tracey Hooten, Blount Island Shipboard Fire, Transcript, 16,19,24

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 2, 7:9, 16

[1] Ibid, 8

[1] Powers Press Conference, First Coast News, 6/04/20

[1] SSA Atlantic, Jolly v. Hoegh, Motion for Summary Judgement on All Claims, 16

[1] Ibid, 17

[1] JFRD, Investigation and After Action Report, 7:9

[1] Bob Smith, Public Safety Communications Magazine, 7/08

[1] Catherine Cyrus, email message to Brandice Johnson, 10/12/21

[1] Richard Lundy, JFRD Emergency Pro Romeo Report, FR-00064084-2020—06-04

[1] Sharon Crow, “email message to”, Chief Powers, 6/8/2020

[1] Wayne Perry, Associated Press, Investigative hearings open into cargo ship fire that killed 2 New Jersey firefighters, 1/10/24, https://whyy.org/articles/nj-cargo-ship-fire-firefighter-deaths-investigative-hearings-open/

[1]  FireRescue1, Associated Press, Wayne Parry January 17, 2024, https://whyy.org/articles/newark-cargo-ship-blaze-firefighter-deaths-call-to-fire-department-leadership/

88 Interview with Capt. Ashton Geohagen, JFRD Fire Division, 3/18/25

Appendix A: Current State of Affairs

Appendix B: Timeline summary

Times quoted or estimated from:

Incident Details Report FR-000640084-2020-06-04

2020 Shipboard Fire-Investigation and After Action Report

Radio transcript created by Chief Hooten (no transmission times given).

June 4, 2020, all p.m.

4:01 First JFRD Units dispatched.

4:04 First Unit, E-48 arrives

4:24 Forward Operations F-4 reports language barriers, Co2 alarms, report of decks 7/ 8 full of smoke

4:24 F-4 Reports all crew accounted for

4:35 F-4, L-30 and E-35 make recon entry into ship

5:00 F-9 reports heavy heat decks 8-11

5:33 C-2A arrives on scene

5:35 L-4 making entry into deck 8

5:43 F-9 reports explosion on 8th floor (tires?)

5:46 F-4 reports all JFRD crews on entry deck leaving the ship

5:49 F-4 reports Deck 7 smoke but no heat, Decks 8/9 full of heat and smoke

???   F-4 evacuates all firefighters from the ship after a rapid, intense heat rise on deck 10.

    Shifts operations from offensive to defensive. Recommended to Command and Executive Staff

     remain defensive and move vehicles and equipment further away from the ship. F-4 sent to Rehab

     by C-2A.

6:04 F-1 has assumed Forward Operations and shifts operations from defensive back to offensive.

6:04 A Loud siren noise was reported by R-49

6:04 F-1 directs C2A to the top of ship to shut the starboard side hatches

6:25 L-7 reports all roof hatches secure

6:26 F-1 reports fans running on decks 8/9

6:35 L-7 reports smoke coming out of deck 9 vent

6:37 F-1 tells L-7, “Anything you can open that will access those three decks would be great”

6:41 L-7 reports “access doors to top vents opened for decks 7-9 on starboard side”

6:43 L-7 reports “a hatch blew”.

6:43 F-1 responds, “L-7, can you get it gated”? (kept open)

6:46 L-34 reports an explosion

6:48 F-4 tells FCOM “need 5 Rescues”

6:51 F-4 establishes Medical Branch

6/10/ 20: Director Powers creates Blount Island Shipboard Fire Committee

7/15/20:  I meet with Chiefs Lesniak/Riska. Told that there would be no training and ordered to “not  

               point fingers.”

7/16/20:  I’m ordered to the Union office. Told by Wyse to “not point fingers.”

8/27/20:  SFM receives JFRD After Action Report2/3/21:  NTSB publishes its report

5/12/21: SFM Investigators interview me.

5/27/21: Discover my AAR Committee questionnaire stripped of my answers

unknown: SFM meets with JFRD Director Powers and asks for missing documents

1/20/22: Told not to talk about the ship fire by Chief Hooten in his office

8/23/22:  SFM Investigator Schell meets with Director Powers, and he wants to know how she knew about the shift to defensive and then back to offensive. She called me and warned me of possible retaliation by Director Powers

7/5/23: Newark Fire Captains killed in RoRo ship fire in Port Newark